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murder of the first degree as defined in the above quoted
section of the Penal Code. (People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387
[281 P. 609]; People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 P.2d 51].)
For the foregoing reasons I would reduce the degree of
the crime to that of murder of the second degree.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8,
1957. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be gTanted.

(L. A. No. 24129.

In Bank.

Apr. 12, 1957.]

THE CI'rY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellant, v. BELRIDGE
OIL COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent.
[1] Licenses-Power to License or Tax-Territorial Limitations.·where a business license tax sought to be collected is a
privilege tax exacted for the privilege of engaging in the
activity of "selling," and this activity takes place within the
city, the rate of tax may be measured by the gross receipts
attributable to selling activities within the city though some
of them are attributable to extraterritorial elements, such as
production and delivery of goods, since such selling activity
can constitutionally be taxed by the city though the goods
never enter its territorial limits.
[2] !d.-Power to License or Tax-Territorial Limitations.-To
allow a city to levy a license tax based on gross receipts attributable to selling activities outside the city would be an
unreasonable discrimination and a denial of equal protection
of the law.
[3] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construction.-\Vhere a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, the court will adopt
the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its
entirety or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, though
the other construction is equally reasonable.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Licenses, § 7 et seq.; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 7
et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 61 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Constitutional Law, § 96 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Licenses, § 9; [3] Constitutional
Law, § 48; (4] Licenses, § 35.5.
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[4] Licenses-Amount of Tax-Method of Allocation.-Under a

city ordinance imposing a tax on those engaged in selling
goods, wares or merchandise within the city, where only that
portion of the gross receipts directly attributable to an oil
company's selling activities carried on in the city could be
taxed and the parties stipulated that by a method of allocation
"fairly calculated to determine [the company's] gross receipts"
20 per cent thereof was derived from selling activities in the
city, the trial court correctly applied the tax formula to 20
per cent of such company's gross receipts.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Joseph IN. Vickers, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to recover license taxes.
affirmed.

Judgment for defendant

Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Bourke Jones and James
A. Doherty, Assistant City Attorneys, for Appellant.
Wellborn, Barrett & Rodi, Vernon Barrett and F. C.
Lowell Head for Respondent.
CARTER, J.-'l'his is an appeal by the city of Los Angeles
from a judgment entered upon a retrial after a decision by
this court (City of Los Angeles v. Belridge OiL Co., 42 Cal.2d
823 [271 P.2d 5]) reversing a judgment in favor of defendant, Belridge Oil Company.
The only question involved here is whether the trial court
properly applied the law as set forth in our decision* on the
prior appeal.
Upon the retrial the parties stipulated that all of the gross
receipts of the defendant ''are attributable in part to its
selling activities within the City of Los Angeles and in part
to its selling activities without the City'' and that ''not more
than 20% of defendant's total gross receipts for the years
1948 and 1949 are attributable to defendant's business [or
selling activities] in the City of Los Angeles under any
method of allocation which is fairly calculated to determine the
defendant's gross receipts derived from or attributable to
sources within the City of l;os Angeles and to determine the
defendant's gross receipts derived from or attributable to
sources outside the City of Los Angeles" subject to plaintiff
*The facts are fully set forth therein.
48 C.2d-ll
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city's right to maintain on
that there should be no
allocation of
for the purpose of determining the
amount of th(~ tax and that the tax should be measured by
defendant's total gro:,;s receipts. Defendant agreed that 20
per cent of its total gross receipts for the years 1948 and
1949 might be used to measure the tax to be imposed upon
it under section 21.166 of plaintiff's license ordinance for the
years 1949 and 1950.
'l'he trial court held, in accord with the stipulations entered
into between the parties, that defendant was subject to the
liL•ense tax ( § 21.166) for such portion of its gross receipts
''as is derived from or attributable to its business or selling
activities in the City of lJos Angeles; that such portion of
such gross receipts should be determined under some method
of allocation which is fairly calculated to determine the defendant's gross receipts derived from or attributable to sources
within the City of Los Angeles and to determine the defendant's gross receipts derived from or attributable to
sources outside the City of Los Angeles." And that "Not
more than 20% of defendant's total gross receipts for the
years 1948 and 1949 are derived from or attributable to defendant's business in the city of Los Angeles.'' And that
"Not more than 20% of defendant's total gross receipts for
the years 1948 and 1949 are derived from or attributable to
defendant's selling activities in the City of Los Angeles."
In harmony with its conclusion, the trial court held that
there remained due and owing to the plaintiff from the defendant the sum of $536.43, including both principal and
interest.
The primary argument of the plaintiff is that this court
did not, in its prior opinion, hold that there should be an
allocation of the total gross receipts of defendant based upon
the selling activities directly attributable to the Los Angeles
part of defendant's business.
Section 21.166 of the Los Angeles City Tax Ordinance provides that "Every person manufacturing and selling any
goods, wares or merchandise at wholesale, or selling goods,
wares, or merchandise at wholesale, and not otherwise specifically licensed by other provisions of this Article, shall pay for
each calendar year, or portion thereof, the sum of $8.00 for
the first $20,000, or less, of gross receipts, and, in addition.
" We held (p. 830) that "defendant's Los Angeles
offiee was engaged in the activity of 'selling goods, wares or
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merchandise at wholesale' within the city of Los Angeles and
was therefore subject to the provisions of section 21.166 of
the r~os Angeles tax ordinance.'' We also specifically held
(pp. 831, 832) that "There is, however, one important limitation which should be pointed out and that is this: even
though the
can tax the activity of selling it can only
base the tax on such selling activities as are carried out within
its territorial limits. For this reason it is only those gross
receipts which are attributable to selling activities within
the city which should form the basis for the rate of tax. Gross
receipts attributable to selling activities conducted outside the
city should not be ineluded. Such a construction necessarily
follows from the fact that the business license tax is on the
privilege of en gaging in selling activities in the city of Los
Angeles and as such should only be based on such activities.''
[1] Plaintiff argues that the controversy centers around
the statement made by this court (p. 831) that "Defendant
company also contends that even if section 21.166 is applicable,
the city cannot eonstitutionally tax the total gross receipts
of the company since such would be an attempt to impose a
tax on business carried on outside the city. This argument
is based on the ground that since the total gross receipts include the proceeds of products produced and delivered outside the city the effect would be to allow a city to tax transactions occurring outside its boundaries. This argument seems
to lose sight of the nature of section 21.166." This statement \ms directed at defendant's argument that some of its
gross receipts were attributable to extraterritorial elements
such as the production and delivery of the goods. \Ve held that
there \vas no constitutional objection to resorting to extraterritorial elements in determining the rate of tax (Great
Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co. v. Gros.iean, 301 U.S. 412 [57 S.Ct.
772, 81 LEd. 1193, 112 A.I.1.R. 293] ; <Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250
TT.S. 525 [40 S.Ot. 2, 63 I_.1.Ed. 1124]; Cedar Hills Cemetery
Corp. v. Dish·ict of Columbia, 124 F.2d 286). We concluded
that "']'he activity being taxed here is the activity of selling
ancl !'Inch activity can be taxed by the city even though the
goods 11evrr enter its territorial limits. (Keystone Metal Co.
v. T'illslmroh, supm, 874 Pa. 828 r97 A.2d 7971.)"
[2] Plaint.ifr <H"g'tti>c; that the requil'<'liWllis of Clue process
and t•qnal pr·ott•dion do not (•ompel an apportionment of re('t>ipts aitrihuiable io the husirwss earried on within the city.
'rhis argument was answered adversely to plaintiff in our
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opinion on the prior appeal where we held that ''To allow a
city to levy a license tax based upon gross receipts attributable
to selling activities outside the city would be an unreasonable discrimination and a denial of equal protection of the
law. (See Ferran v. City of Pa~o Alto, 50 Cal.App.2d 374
[122 P.2d 965].) If such taxation were allowed it would unjustly discriminate against those firms whose selling activities in Los Angeles compose but a small fraction of the
total sales effort and whose gross receipts are in large part
attributable to selling activities in other areas. [3] As stated
in Franklin v. Petm"son, 87 Cal.App.2d 727, 730 [197 P.2d
788], 'It is the rule that where a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it
constitutional and the other unconstitutional, in whole or in
part, the court will adopt the construction which, without
doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used,
will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to
its constitutionality, even though the other construction is
equally reasonable. The rule is based on the presumption
that the legislative body intended not to violate the Constitution, but to make a valid statute or ordinance within the scope
of its constitutonal powers.' In the instant case a just and
reasonable construction requires that the measure of the tax
be limited to those gross receipts attributable to selling activities within the city of Los Angeles.''
Plaintiff's argument concerning the intent and meaning of
the "Bradley-Burns Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax Law"
enacted by the T_;egislature in 1955 [Rev. & Tax. Code, § 7200
et seq.) does not merit discussion. We are here concerned
with a business license tax imposed by the city of T_;os Angeles, the applicable section of which we have heretofore held
applied to selling activities carried on within the city, the
tax to be measured by that portion of the gross receipts
directly attributable to the defendant's selling activities in
the city. ( 42 Cal.2d 823.)
[4] Having heretofore held that only that portion of the
gross receipts directly attributable to defendant's selling
activities carried on in the city of Los Angeles may be taxed
under section 21.166, and the parties having stipulated that
by a method of allocation "fairly calculated to determine the
defendant's gross receipts" 20 per cent thereof was derived
from se1ling activities in the city of l.10S Angeles, we conclude
that the trial court was correct in applying the tax formula
to 20 per cent of defendant's gross receipts.
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Plaintiff's other contentions are an attempt to reargue matters concluded on the former appeal and need no discussion
here.
'rhe judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, .J., Schauer, J., Spence,
J., and McComb, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 24137.

In Bank.

Apr. 12, 1957.]

EMILY M. COLLINS, Appellant, v. IWBERT F. COLLINS,
Respondent.
[1] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Fraud.-Where a
wife contemplated obtaining a divorce for some time before she
made a property settlement agreement and obtained the
divorce, and the husband did nothing to hinder her investigation of the character and value of the property or to cause
her to execute the agreement precipitately, he owed her no
duty to force her to investigate the property when she announced that she was satisfied with the agreement prepared
by his counsel.
[2] !d.-Transactions Inter Se-Fraud.-A husband at the time
of divorce or separation is entitled to take a position favorable to his own interest in claiming as his separate property
assets that a court might hold to be community property, and
when confronted with the husband's assertion that certain
assets are his separate property the wife must take her own
position and if necessary investigate the facts.
(3] Fraud-Reliance on Representation-Effect of Investigation.When one undertakes an investigation and proceeds with it
without hindrance, it will be assumed that he continued until
he acquired all the knowledge he desired; he cannot be heard
to say that he relied on the representations of the other party.
[4] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Fraud.-A husband is hound in his dealings with his wife to the highest and
best of good faith and is obligated in such dealings not to
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife,§§ 64, 77; Am.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 184.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, § 37; Am.Jur., Fraud and
Deceit, § 35.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6] Husband and Wife,§ 165; [3]
Fraud,§ 28; [7] Husband and Wife,§ 157(1); [8, 10] Husband and
Wife, § 157(10); [9, 11] Judgments, §§ 12.5, 62.

